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In Kenya, trade policy reforms in the cereals sector were initiated as a key component 
of the economy-wide structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) during the mid 1980s. 
The SAPs were later strengthened and made irreversible by Kenya’s commitments at 
the multilateral trade negotiations. However, the welfare effects of these trade policy 
reforms remain controversial. This paper to quantifies the market and welfare impacts 
of trade liberalization in Kenya’s maize sector using a partial equilibrium model with 
market interrelationships at the farm, wholesale and retail levels. The model is 
calibrated to simulate a 24 percent reduction in maize import tariffs and a complete 
abolition of tariffs. The simulations results suggest that tariff reductions yield price 
decreases across the three market levels. The declining prices increase maize 
consumption but reduce domestic production. Consequently, consumer surplus 
increases while producer surplus decreases. However, the gain in consumer surplus is 
not sufficient to compensate the loss in producer surplus. Thus, the implementation of 
the multilateral agricultural trade agreement is likely to leave Kenya’s maize sector 
worse off and cannot be considered as a viable policy based on the compensation 
principle. 
 
JEL Classification: F14, F16, I32, C68, O24, Q12 
Key words: Trade liberalization; maize; partial equilibrium analysis; welfare effects.  1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, Kenya like most other developing countries has 
implemented two types of economic reforms in her staple grain markets. In the mid 
1980’s, the reform of food markets was an important component of the economy-wide 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) adopted by developing countries (Minot and 
Goletti, 2000). The SAPs entailed the privatization (withdrawal of state agencies from 
grain pricing and marketing activities) and liberalization (the relaxation of regulatory 
controls on private marketing) of staple grain marketing and pricing in over 20 
countries in Africa (World Bank, 1994).  
 
In the 1990’s, the cereal sector SAPs were deepened by Kenya’s trade liberalization 
commitments at the multilateral trade negotiations that culminated in the creation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The key multilateral rules affecting grain trade 
relate to the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), whose main 
pillars are improved market access, reduced domestic support and the elimination of 
export subsidies. Among the WTO modalities, the market access commitments have 
had the most important impacts on grain marketing in Kenya, particularly with regard 
to the tariff reduction measures implemented after 1995.  
 
In Kenya, the grain market reforms have been concentrated in the maize sector 
because of its strategic position as the key staple food and a source of income for a 
vast majority of the population. Prior to the SAPs, maize markets in Kenya were 
strictly controlled by the government that enforced administratively determined pan-
seasonal and pan-territorial prices. Maize marketing was monopolized by the National 
Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), a state sponsored single-desk marketing board. Kenya’s maize sector reforms began in the mid 1980’s and intensified through the 
1990’s. By the time of signing the URAA in 1995, the county was implementing the 
SAPs and had substantially liberalized its grain markets. Moreover, Kenya has 
complied with its basic URAA commitments on the market access pillar, since all her 
agricultural tariffs are bound and their applied rates are below the ceiling (WTO, 
2000). The country has no WTO commitments on the domestic support pillar since all 
such measures pertain to the exempt categories or are within the de minimis levels. In 
addition, Kenya does not grant export subsidies on any of her agricultural products.  
 
Currently, the government intervenes in the maize sector via two policy instruments: 
the operations of the NCPB and an import tariff. The Board remains active in a 
liberalized market, but its role has been confined to the management of a national 
strategic grain reserve (Wangia et al, 2001). Maize imports from member states of the 
East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for East and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) enter Kenya duty free, but must be accompanied by a certificate of 
origin (Nyangito et al, 2004). Imports from other parts of the world are subject to a 25 
percent import tariff. All imports are subject to an Import Declaration Fee of 2.75 
percent, pre-shipment inspection and phytosanitary certification (WTO, 2000). 
 
However, the impacts of trade liberalization on Kenya’s maize sector are mired in 
controversy. On the one hand, farm lobby groups argue that increased market access 
lowers producer prices, which serves as a disincentive to production and thus a direct 
threat to food security (Mghenyi, 2006). Conversely, the elimination of food subsidies 
under the SAPs in Africa has been thought to exacerbate food insecurity for low 
income consumers (Jayne and Argwings-Kodhek, 1997).  While the potential gainers and losers have generally been identified, a review of the 
literature indicates that the magnitudes of these gains/loses and their distributional 
effects remain largely unexplored. Thus, there exists an empirical gap that needs to be 
bridged. This paper employs an economic surplus framework to quantify the 
gains/loses from trade liberalization in Kenya’s maize sector. Specifically, the paper’s 
objectives are twofold: to estimate the market and welfare impacts of reducing maize 
import tariffs levels in Kenya and to draw policy recommendations. 
 
A review of the theoretical approaches used to measure the effects of agricultural 
trade reforms along with their empirical applications was undertaken. In this regard, a 
vast majority of trade policy studies have employed simulation models owing to their 
structural tractability. Given the desire to derive detailed sector information, a partial 
equilibrium approach was adopted and thus, a PEM of trade was employed. The paper 
is laid out as follows. The next two sections present the basic framework of the PEM 
of trade and its calibration. Section four reports the simulation results and the paper 
closes by drawing some conclusions and policy implications for the maize sector.  
 
2.  The Simulation Model 
 
The basic PEM of agricultural trade follows the rule of spatial arbitrage that trade 
between two regions occurs when the price difference between them reaches the 
transfer cost (Krishnaiah, 1995). It assumes perfect substitutability between domestic 
and imported commodities. The model entails a demand equation to determine 
consumption, a supply equation to determine production and a supply-demand 
identity to determine market clearing conditions. It can be conceptualized by a set of 
panel diagrams showing the responses of agents at various market levels (Figure 1).   Kenya     Rest of the World 
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Figure 1. Effects of Import Tariffs Changes on the Maize Sector in Kenya A graphical formulation of a PEM is used to illustrate the impacts of trade 
liberalization on Kenya’s maize sector following the work of Houck, 1986. It features 
trade in maize between two spatially separated markets; Kenya and the rest of the 
world (RoW). The model comprises of linear supply and demand schedules at the 
farm, wholesale and retail levels. Maize trade occurs at the wholesale market level in 
the form of unprocessed grain. The model simulates the effects of a reduction in 
import tariff levels on the welfare of agents at the three market levels. The simulations 
undertaken are in line with Kenya’s market access commitments at the WTO.  
 
The small-country importer assumption is made in this model since Kenya is a net 
importer of maize that does not control a large share of the world market. Thus, 
domestic maize prices are fixed in the world market independently of the quantities 
imported. Suppose the demand and supply for maize in Kenya is represented by 
curves D and S respectively (Figure 1). In autarky, the domestic wholesale prices in 
Kenya are higher than the world price (Pw). Thus the country is in a potential excess 
demand (ED) situation equal to (d’ – s’) and imports OQF from the world market. 
 
When external trade is allowed with a fixed import tariff (T), the initial equilibrium 
obtains at price PW + T where demand exceeds supply by (d – s). The tariff shifts the 
excess demand curve from ED to ED’ and the quantity imported drops from OQF to 
OQT. The effects of trade liberalization at the wholesale market level can be analyzed 
by abolishing the import tariff. Subsequently, supply increases as wholesale prices 
decline from Pw + T to Pw. This policy measure shifts the excess demand curve back 
to ED from ED’ as imports climb back to OQF (Figure 1).  The wholesale level is linked to the farm and retail sector through marketing margins 
and a technical coefficient of processing. Producer prices are linked to wholesale and 
consumer prices through exogenously determined marketing margins. In addition, the 
quantities at the wholesale and retail levels are linked by a technical coefficient of 
processing. Subsequently, the effect of the tariff reduction at the wholesale level is 
transmitted to the retail and farm level via the price transmission elasticities between 
wholesale and farm prices and between wholesale and retail prices respectively.  
 
The reduction in wholesale prices results to a shift in the derived supply at the retail 
level from Sr to Sr’ (Figure 1). Consequently, retail prices fall from Prt to Pr as retail 
demand increases from Qrt to Qr. In this model, farm supply (SF) is an aggregate 
function of the output derived from commercial (SLf) and subsistence farmers (SSf) 
owing to the dual nature of Kenya’s maize production. It might have a negative price 
intercept since subsistence farmers will produce for home consumption even when 
prices are zero (Figure 1). The decline in prices at the wholesale level results to a 
backward shift in farm derived demand from Df to Df’. Consequently, farm prices fall 
from Pft to Pf and the derived demand at the farm level falls from Qft to Qf. 
 
The tariff reduction yields gains and losses that are distributed among producers, 
wholesalers and consumers. At the retail level, consumer surplus increases from the 
initial surplus with a tariff equal to the area under triangle (1) to area (1 + 2) in Figure 
1. The retailer surplus at the wholesale level increases by area (6 + 8). However, the 
wholesaler surplus at the farm level declines from area (6 + 7) to area (7). The tariff 
reduction leads to a loss of government revenue equal to area (8). In addition, 
producer surplus at the farm level declines from area (3 + 4) to area (3).  At the wholesale level, the tariff reduction results in efficiency gains that are equal to 
the mirror images of the areas under the triangles marked (e and f). Overall, the 
economic consequences of the tariff reduction might include an increase in maize 
consumption and imports, and a decrease in production. These translate to an increase 
in consumer and wholesaler surplus, but to a decrease in producer and retailer surplus 
and a loss in government revenue. However, the net effect of the tariff reduction 
depends on the actual sizes of the gains and losses made by the respective groups, 
which can only be determined empirically. 
 
3.  Model Calibration 
 
The model comprises of four blocks of equations: prices, supply, consumption and 
market clearing identities for maize at three market levels (Table 2). The price block 
defines the relationship between domestic producer and consumer prices and between 
world and border (wholesale) prices. The production block is composed of three 
equations representing supply at the three market levels. Conversely, the consumption 
block shows the demand for maize at the retail, wholesale and farm levels. Finally, 
the equilibrium conditions equate supply to demand at all three market levels.  
 
The price block is composed of three equations that reflect the relationships between 
producer and consumer prices and between border and world prices. Producer prices 
(Pf) are linked to consumer prices (Pr) by an exogenously determined domestic 
marketing margin (MGr) that reflects the transportation and distributions costs 
incurred in the movement of maize from producing to consuming areas (Table 2). All 
maize prices are exogenously determined by the fixed world price, since Kenya is a 
small-country importer of maize. Consumer prices are linked to wholesale prices (Pw) by an exogenously determined 
margin reflecting transfer costs from the border to the consuming areas (Table 2). The 
border price is linked to the fixed world price (PI), adjusted by the exchange rate 
(EXR) and the applied import tariff (T). Supply at the wholesale and retail levels is 
derived from primary supply at the farm level. Similarly, demand at the wholesale and 
farm level is derived from primary demand at the retail level. 
 
Table 2. Description of the Partial Equilibrium Model of Trade 
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Specifically, wholesale demand is the sum of supply at the wholesale level plus 
imports. On the other hand, wholesale supply is identically equal to the output at the 
farm level (Table 2). The quantity supply at the retail level is the product of wholesale 
demand multiplied by a technical coefficient of processing (θ). In this study, an 
average grain extraction rate of 97 percent is used as the coefficient of processing.  The model is closed by a block of three equations equating demand and supply at the 
three market levels. External trade occurs at the wholesale level where quantity 
demanded is an aggregate of domestic production and imports. To solve the model, 
estimates are required for the quantities supplied and consumed at the three market 
levels, their elasticities and the corresponding prices. In addition, data is required on 
import tariff rates, exchange rates and transfer costs. This data is derived from the 
central bureau of statistics (CBS), while the elasticities used are taken from Nzuma 
(2007) and shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3. Base Data for Policy Simulation 
Variable Mnemonic  Base  Values 
Market Clearing Quantities (‘000’) MT    
Retail Level  r Q   2662 
Wholesale Level  w Q  2755 
Farm Level  f Q  2445 
Real Prices (KES/MT)   
Retail Level  r P   11314 
Wholesale Level  w P   11249 
Farm Level  f P   10542 
Source: Author’s Computations from Economic Surveys and MOA Annual Reports 
 
On the production side, acreage response for maize is assumed to depend on the 
expected future market prices. The own-price elasticity of supply for maize at the 
farm-level is set at 2.17 while the elasticities at the wholesale and retail level are 2.13 
and 5.20 respectively (Table 4). These elasticities are imposed on price values of 
10542, 11249 and 11314 KES/MT for the farm, wholesale and market levels 
respectively. Further, the elasticities are imposed on quantities of 2445, 2755 and 
2662 MT respectively for the same market levels.  
 Table 4. Base Elasticity Values for Sensitivity Analysis 
Parameter  Base Value  Standard Deviation 
Own-Price Elasticities of Demand 
Retail Level  -0.80 0.120 
Wholesale Level  -2.34 0.500 
Farm Level  -1.41 0.165 
Own-Price Elasticities of Supply  
Retail Level  5.20 0.328 
Wholesale Level  2.13 0.175 
Farm Level  2.17 0.124 
Cross-Market Elasticities 
Retail Level  2.34 0.500 
Wholesale Level  5.20 0.328 
Farm Level  2.13 0.175 
Source: Author’s Computations 
 
On the consumption side, aggregate demand for maize depends on its own price and 
the prices of other grains, all relating to the current period. Consumer expenditures in 
this study are held constant since the demand schedules are linear and homogeneous. 
The own-price elasticity of retail demand for maize is set at -0.80 while the own-price 
elasticities at the wholesale and farm levels are -2.34 and -1.41 respectively (Table 4). 
These elasticities are applied on the price and quantity values presented in Table 3.  
 
The reliability of the results in any simulation is driven by the choice of base scenario 
values and the range of parameter values. A Monte Carlo experiment featuring 1000 
replications of the PEM is used for sensitivity analysis. Table 4 reports the base 
values for the elasticities along with their standard errors. These parameters are used 
to generate the random numbers in the sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
 The General Algebraic Modeling Systems (GAMS) package was used to solve the 
equations in the model. It was constructed to reproduce the 1995/96 base values, 
which represents the period when Kenya began implementing the WTO market access 
commitments. The Uruguay Round negotiations in 1995 produced an agreement for 
developing countries to cut tariffs on agricultural products by an average of 24 
percent over ten years with a minimum cut of ten percent. During this period, maize 
imports into Kenya were subjected to an ad valorem tariff of 25 percent.  
 
Subsequently, a tariff reduction of 24 percent was simulated using the 1995/96 base 
values and used to quantify the impacts of trade liberalization. Given the existing 
applied tariff of 25 percent on maize imports, the change in tariffs amounts to a six 
percentage reduction and thus, the impacts of a 19 percent applied tariff were 
simulated and compared with the base solution values. The tariff reductions were 
assumed to be implemented in 1995/96 and maintained at that level through 2004/05 
when the 10 year WTO grace period expired.  
 
4.  Simulation Results 
The simulation provides quantitative measures of the welfare impacts of trade 
liberalization. At the base solution, a producer surplus of about KES 20 billion is 
estimated (Table 5). In addition, a retailer surplus at the wholesale level of KES 3.2 
billion and a wholesaler surplus at the farm level of KES 15 billion are generated. 
Overall, the intermediate level generates a surplus of about KES 19 billion (Table 
7.5). Furthermore, consumers gain about KES 49 billion while the government 
generates a tariff revenue of KES 0.39 billion (Table 7.5). 
 Overall, a social surplus of KES 88 billion is generated for the entire maize sector at 
the existing tariff levels. The results of the welfare analysis seem to suggest that 
consumers are the largest (relative) beneficiaries from maize trade reforms in Kenya 
while the lowest welfare gains are generated at the intermediate level. This is 
expected given the small-country importer assumption that ensures that prices at the 
wholesale level are fixed in world markets. Thus, it is reasonable to expect stable 
wholesale prices, which generate the low welfare changes.  
Table 5. Impacts of the URAA Trade Commitments on Kenya’s Maize sector 
 
Variable Description 
Trade Liberalization Scenario 
Base Values  24% Tariff Cut  % Change 
Retail Level 
Equilibrium Price (KES/MT)  11306.693 11140.331  -1.47
Equilibrium Quantity (‘000’ MT)  2663.375 2694.689  1.18
Consumer Surplus (Billion KES)  48.957 49.309  0.72
Wholesale Level 
Equilibrium Price (KES/MT)  11249.000 10825.100  -3.77
Equilibrium Quantity (‘000’ MT)  2745.748 2778.030  1.18
Imports (‘000’ MT)  218.375 368.645  68.81
Tariff Revenue (Billion KES)  0.386 0.495  28.24
Retailer Surplus (Billion KES) 3.168 2.616  -17.42
Wholesaler Surplus (Billion KES)  15.447 14.420  -6.65
Intermediate Level Surplus  19.000 17.532  -7.73
Farm-Level 
Equilibrium Price (KES/MT)  10542.000 10305.643  -2.24
Equilibrium Quantity (‘000’ MT)  2445.000 2326.044  -4.87
Producer Surplus (Billion KES)  19.836 18.596  -6.25
Social Surplus (Billion KES)  88.179 85.932  -2.55
 
Table 5 also reports the impacts of a 24 percent tariff cut in line with Kenya’s market 
access commitments at the UR negotiations. Relative to the base solution values, the 
24 percent tariff reduction leads to a decrease in maize prices across all the three 
market levels. At the wholesale level, prices decline by about four percent while both 
farm and retail prices decrease by about two percent (Table 5). The price fall causes a 
one percentage increase in consumption and a 69 percent increase in imports, but 
leads to a two percent decrease in domestic maize production (Table 5). Consequently, the 24 percent tariff reduction leads to a six percent fall in producer 
surplus and a 0.72 percent increase in consumer surplus (Table 5). At the intermediate 
level, retailer surplus at the wholesale level falls by 17 percent while wholesaler 
surplus at the farm level falls by seven percent (Table 5). The increased imports lead 
to a 28 percent rise in government tariff revenue. The net effect of the tariff cut at the 
intermediate level is an eight percent decline in wholesaler surplus.  
 
Overall, the 24 percent reduction in tariffs leads to a three percent decline in social 
surplus which translates to a loss of welfare of about KES 2.25 billion (Table 5). To 
put matters into perspective, the loss in social welfare amounts to a quarter of the 
budgetary allocation to the ministry of Agriculture in the 2006/7 financial year at KES 
10.28 billion (GoK, 2007). The foregoing welfare analysis suggests that the gain to 
consumers is not large enough to offset the loss to producers. Thus, tariff reductions 
as a trade reform policy have no compensating potential in Kenya’s maize sector. In 
practice, policy changes that have no compensating potential cannot be recommended 
based on Harberger’s (1971) welfare postulates.   
 
In order to verify the validity of the estimated impacts of trade liberalization in 
Kenya’s maize sector, the simulation results were subjected to a sensitivity analysis. 
The Monte Carlo experiment replicated the baseline welfare measures 1000 times. 
The random outcomes were generated from a multivariate normal distribution of the 
base values using the mean and standard deviations of the elasticities at all the three 
market levels.  The mean and standard deviations of the surplus measures were then 
used to compute the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
  Table 6. Confidence Intervals of the Base Solution Welfare Values 
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Notes. The figures in Parenthesis give the coefficients of variation of the variables. All numbers in the 
table are average values derived from model runs for 1000 periods 
Source: Author’s Computations in GAMS 
Table 6 reports the simulated welfare measures from the Monte Carlo experiment at 
their 95 percent confidence intervals. The mean values of the surplus measures 
generated at the three market levels were within the bounds of the 95 percent 
confidence interval (Table 6). Thus, the estimated surplus measures in all cases were 
significant at the five percent level. While producer surplus was the most stable 
welfare measure, wholesaler surplus had the highest level of variability (Table 6). 
However, the variability of all welfare measures is quite low as indicated by the 
coefficients of variation, implying that the estimated surplus measures are stable.  
 
To demonstrate the validity of the estimated welfare measures, a histogram of the 
base social surplus values is generated. Figure 2 shows the probability distribution 
function of the simulated social surplus at the 95 percent confidence interval. The 
mean, mode and median values of the social surplus run quite close to the centre of 
the density function (Figure 2). However, the density distribution function is slightly 
skewed to the right, as indicated by the skewness measure of -1.02. 
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Source: Author’s Computations in GAMS 
Figure 2. Probability Density Function of the Base Social Surplus 
 
The results of the sensitivity analysis validate the robustness of the simulated welfare 
measures with regard to the base solution values. Specifically, the results of the 
Monte Carlo experiment suggest that the simulated welfare measures were stable and 
significant at the five percent level. It can, therefore, be concluded that the GAMS 
simulation model performs quite well. Thus, the results generated were accurate and 





 5.  Conclusions and Policy Remarks 
This paper quantifies the impacts of trade liberalization in Kenya’s maize sector. A 
PEM model of trade that takes into account the market interrelationships across three 
levels is used. The model incorporates external trade and simulates the welfare effects 
of reducing import tariffs over the liberalized period. A major finding of this analysis 
is that a 24 percent tariff cut would lower market prices and increases maize 
consumption but reduces domestic production in Kenya. Moreover, tariff reductions 
would stimulate increases in maize imports.  
 
However, the declining prices are accompanied by increased price variability that 
dampens the gains to consumers. Even though consumers benefit from tariff 
reductions, the loss in producer surplus outstrips consumer benefits by a ratio of 
22.32, which curtails any potential for producer compensation. The net effect is a loss 
in social welfare. This implies that the URAA trade commitments with regard to 
Kenya’s maize sector cannot be passed based on the compensation principle. Instead 
policies that improve the responses of producers should be advocated while maize 
consumers should be encouraged to diversify their consumption to other cereals.  
 
Given the fact that Kenya is a developing country with limited revenue generating 
sources, compensating losers from trade liberalization in the maize sector might not 
be viable. An alternative is to undertake complimentary reforms that are necessary to 
transmit world prices to consumers but at the same time improve the ability of 
producers to respond to incentives. The international development literature identifies 
such incentives to include investments in infrastructure, institutions, information 
services, agricultural credit, human capital development and research and extension.  6.  References 
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